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Shining the Spotlight on European Union
Environmental Compliance
CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN*
The practical application of environmental provisions is the
most serious problem that national, Community and interna-
tional environmental law faces. Even a piece of national legisla-
tion that copies a directive word for word will remain a mere
piece of paper unless it is applied.'
European Union ("EU") environmental law has grown rapidly
in size and complexity in recent years so that it now consists of at
least 300 environmental directives and regulations. Indeed, in an
increasing number of areas of environmental law, including
greenhouse gases controls, toxic chemicals regulation, and ex-
tended producer responsibility regulations (known as "take-back"
laws), EU law now is the world trendsetter, outpacing even U.S.
environmental laws. 2
At the same time that EU environmental laws are multiply-
ing, however, implementation and enforcement of these laws is
lagging. According to a 2004 survey of the European Commission,
just under one one-third of all complaints and cases alleging non-
compliance with EU law that were investigated by the Commis-
* Professor and Director of the Environmental Law Program, Golden Gate Uni-
versity School of Law. Professor Rechtschaffen can be reached at crechtschaf-
fen@ggu.edu. Thanks to Elizabeth Kirk, Karen Kramer, and Eckhard Rehbinder for
their comments on earlier drafts of this article, and to Golden Gate Law School stu-
dents Jennifer Maier, Ashling McAnaney, and David Zizmor for their helpful research
assistance.
1. LUDWIG KRAMER, EC ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, § 12-12 (5th ed. 2003).
2. Theofanis Christoforou, The Precautionary Principle, Risk Assessment, and
the Comparative Role of Science in the European Community and the US Legal Sys-
tems, in GREEN GIANTS? ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION 17 (Norman J. Vig & Michael G. Faire eds., 2004) [hereinafter
GREEN GIANTS?]. For a somewhat different view, see Jonathan Wiener, Convergence,
Divergence, and Complexity in US and European Risk Regulation, in GREEN GIANTS?,
supra, at 73, 90-93 (arguing that the United States and EU each are more precaution-
ary in some areas, but less in other areas).
1
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
sion concerned noncompliance with environmental laws. 3 Indeed,
there is a greater lack of implementation and enforcement of EU
environmental requirements than of any other area of EU
regulation.
The challenges to ensuring that regulated entities comply
with EU law are considerable, given the diversity of EU states and
the highly limited enforcement tools possessed by institutions at
the community-wide, EU level. EU laws, while adopted at the
community level, are implemented and enforced by individual
member states. EU institutions themselves lack any direct en-
forcement authority, and face considerable obstacles when even
attempting to monitor compliance with EU requirements in any
individual country. The challenge of achieving compliance will
grow in the future as the number of environmental requirements
increases, the EU embraces smaller and more varied regulated
entities (such as small businesses, small municipalities, and agri-
culture), and EU membership grows.
For these reasons, new approaches to promoting compliance
with EU environmental law are needed. This article argues that
one promising regulatory tool that the EU could utilize is greater
reliance on information disclosure requirements, particularly
"spotlighting" the compliance records of regulated entities. The
article first explains the difficulties that the EU is currently facing
in enforcing its environmental laws. It then discusses how spot-
lighting has proven to be an effective environmental policy tool
and how the EU has already embraced a spotlighting strategy in
certain areas. Finally, it argues that the EU should use spotlight-
ing as an enforcement strategy because it would provide a potent
method of improving compliance with EU environmental laws.
I. THE CHALLENGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT IN THE EU
There are a number of reasons-some institutional, some po-
litical, and some reflective of European legal culture-why achiev-
ing widespread compliance with EU environmental requirements
has been so challenging.
3. See, e.g., Commission Staff Working Paper, Sixth Annual Survey on the Imple-
mentation and Enforcement of Community Environmental Law 2004, at 4 (Aug. 17,
2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/law/pdf/6th-en.pdf [hereinafter
Sixth Annual Survey]. The Commission noted, however, that there were fewer envi-
ronmental infringement cases in 2004 than in prior years. Id.
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One is the federalist political structure of the EU. EU envi-
ronmental laws are enacted at the community-wide level. Most
EU environmental legislation is adopted in the form of directives,
which bind member states to a certain result but leave the method
of achieving the result to their individual discretion. 4 Thus, even
after enactment by the EU, directives must be formally trans-
posed into national law before they can be actually enforced. 5 (EU
regulations, by contrast, are directly binding on member states
without the need for implementing legislation.)6 The percentage
of EU environmental directives transposed into national laws var-
ies considerably. 7 Further, after the directives are incorporated
into national law, it is the member states and not the EU that
largely bear the responsibility for ensuring that regulated entities
comply with EU requirements. But the EU encompasses states
with widely varying levels of enforcement resources, administra-
tive and technical capacities, experience, and philosophical com-
mitment to enforcement principles.8 Additionally, some countries,
particularly those in southern Europe, believe that economic con-
siderations should have priority over environmental protection.9
For these reasons, the degree to which EU environmental require-
ments are enforced in member states varies considerably. As one
observer recently opined, "in some countries, the national commit-
ment to compliance is questionable, so compliance by their indus-
tries, let alone individual facilities, has to be doubted."10
At the same time, the European Commission, which serves as
an administrative, quasi-executive branch of the EU governing
4. Christopher Demmke, Implementation of Environmental Policy and Law in
the United States and the European Union, in GREEN GIANTs?, supra note 2, at 135.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See id. at 138.
8. See KRAmER, supra note 1, §1-21 ("[Tlhere is a wide gulf between the individ-
ual [miember [s]tates' national environmental policies and regulations.").
9. See id.
10. Ernie Rosenberg, EU's Aspiration Trumped by U.S. Implementation, 23 ENVT.
F. 51, 51 (Mar.-Apr. 2006) (also noting large differences among EU countries, particu-
larly when comparing southern and northern European countries, as to the degree to
which environmental requirements are enforced); see also Luke Goodrich, Implement-
ing Environmental Law in the European Union: Lessons from the Bathing Water Di-
rective, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 301, 301 (2004) (noting the failure of member
states to effectively implement EU law); Richard C. Visek, Implementation and En-
forcement of EC Environmental Law, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 377, 393, 400-02
(1995) (noting that member states lack resources, that member states are concerned
about the economic impacts of regulation, and that EU laws will usurp traditional
state powers).
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structure, lacks any direct enforcement tools. 1 The Commission
has no inspectorate and cannot inspect or monitor facilities. It
cannot directly sue facilities within a member state, penalize indi-
vidual facilities, issue compliance or other orders directed at regu-
lated entities, or exercise criminal enforcement authority. 12
Efforts to enhance the Commission's enforcement authorities have
been resisted as interfering with sovereignty and violative of the
EU's principle of subsidiarity (providing, in general terms that the
EU should only take action at the community level if the objec-
tives of a proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by mem-
ber states).' 3 Also as a result of federalist concerns, the European
Environment Agency, which (in theory) was created to improve
the EU's capacity for monitoring and enforcement of environmen-
tal requirements, has limited powers, and essentially only coordi-
nates the information-gathering activities of member states.1 4
Thus, as Professor Christopher Demmke points out, implementa-
tion of EU law depends largely on cooperative, partnership-ori-
ented approaches.1 5
The only sanction available to the Commission to remedy non-
compliance with environmental laws is to institute "infringement"
procedures against member states that have failed to implement
or enforce EU laws. If that administrative process proves ineffec-
tive, the Commission may sue the states in the European Court of
Justice ("ECJ").16 In recent years, the Commission has instituted
more infringements against member states in the environmental
sector than any other area of EU law.17 Nonetheless, the infringe-
ment process has substantial limits. The small staff of the Com-
mission's Directorate General Environment legal unit is often
"overwhelmed" by the number of complaints alleging environmen-
tal infringements18 (the Directorate General Environment only
has a total staff of about 450 while in comparison the U.S. Envi-
11. See Demmke, supra note 4, at 139.
12. See id. at 140.
13. See KRAMER, supra note 1, § 12-19
14. There is also an informal implementation network called the European Union
Network for Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law ("IMPEL"),
which consists of representatives of enforcement and monitoring bodies of member
states as well as Commission representatives. IMPEL provides for the exchange of
practical ideas and experiences among members. KRAMER, supra note 1, § 12-21.
15. Demmke, supra note 4, at 140.
16. Id.
17. Demmke, supra note 4, at 141.
18. R. Daniel Kelemen, Environmental Federalism in the United States and the
European Union, in GREEN GIANTs?, supra note 2, at 113, 123.
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ronmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has approximately 18,000
employees). 19 On average, the Commission's administrative pro-
cess takes about three years,20 and only about 10% of environmen-
tal cases are referred to the ECJ.21 The average time between the
Commission's decision to initiate an infringement procedure on an
environmental matter and judgment by the ECJ is nearly five
years. 22
Another important consideration-and point where EU law
diverges considerably from U.S. environmental law-is that citi-
zen enforcement of EU directives is possible only in highly circum-
scribed situations. EU citizens do not have a right to bring citizen
enforcement actions against regulated entities who violate EU en-
vironmental requirements. Although private parties can file com-
plaints with the European Commission,23 they cannot challenge a
Commission decision not to refer a particular matter to the ECJ
(and in any case, the Commission can bring suit only against
member states not private regulated entities).
The "direct effect" doctrine provides that in certain circum-
stances individuals may rely directly on provisions of EU law and
sue member states in national courts for not implementing (or not
correctly implementing) an EU directive, (even though, as noted
above, directives normally first must be transposed into national
law to be applicable).24 The doctrine, however, can only be em-
ployed against a government body; it does not allow individuals to
sue regulated entities directly. Moreover, restrictive standing
rules in some member states may prevent environmental groups
from bringing suits in national courts. 25 Individuals also can sue
19. Demmke, supra note 4, at 139. The economies of the EU and the United
States are roughly comparable in size. The population of the EU, however, is about
1.5 times greater than the United States' population, while the United States is about
2.5 times larger in physical size. Id.
20. KRAMER, supra note 1, § 12-42.
21. Id. § 12-33.
22. Kelemen, supra note 18, at 123.
23. Demmke, supra note 4, at 143; European Comm'n, European General Guides:
Enforcing Your Rights in the Single European Market, Who Can Lodge a Complaint to
the European Commission? What is the Procedure? 9 (2005), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/youreurope/nav/en/citizens/services/eu-guide/enforcing-rights/enforcing-
rights-en.pdf.
24. KRAMER, supra note 1, § 12-27; see also Goodrich, supra note 10, at 312-13
(noting that these actions play an increasingly important role in the implementation
of EU directives).
25. Demmke, supra note 4, at 126; see also Sevine Ercmann, Enforcement of Envi-
ronmental Law in United States and European Law: Realities and Expectations, 26
ENVTL. L. 1213, 1222 (1996) (noting divergent provisions of certain EU member states
2007]
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member states for damages suffered as a direct result of a member
state's "serious" breach of EU law, but these actions too are lim-
ited to lawsuits against a member state.26 Finally, even if legal
doctrines were more favorable towards citizen enforcement, as a
practical matter, environmental organizations apparently lack the
muscle of those in the United States. As Kramer maintains,
"[e]nvironmental organisations in Western Europe are structur-
ally and financially too weak to defend environmental interests
effectively over a long period of time."27
A final factor that may contribute to noncompliance with EU
requirements is that the legal culture in most European countries
is less adversarial than the legal culture in the United States. 28
Thus, tort liability is less developed and wide-ranging.29 Moreo-
ver, many European countries traditionally have relied heavily on
cooperative-oriented enforcement strategies rather than on the
traditional deterrence-based enforcement model widely used in
the United States. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to
examine the enforcement practices of individual European coun-
tries, at least some evidence suggests that enforcement in EU
member states is not particularly effective. 30
The bottom line is that for a variety of reasons, noncompli-
ance with its environmental laws has been and continues to be a
major problem for the EU. As two recent scholars concluded,
"It]he biggest obstacle to environmental policy success in the EU
concerning the right of interested individuals and associations to bring actions before
the national courts for noncompliance with EU environmental legislation).
26. Although there are few, if any, cases in which this has been done, scholars
argue that some environmental directives provide rights that could be the basis of
future liability actions. See R. Daniel Kelemen, Regulatory Federalism: EU Environ-
mental Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 20 J. PUBL. POL. 133, 158 (2000) (argu-
ing that when considering criteria for state liability, it is entirely possible that
individuals will bring claims for damages relating to environmental directives in the
future).
27. KRAMER, supra note 1, § 12-13.
28. Wiener, supra note 2, at 76.
29. James A. Lofton, Environmental Enforcement: The Impact of Cultural Values
and Attitudes on Social Regulation, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,906,
10,910 (2001); Steven Kelman, Enforcement of Occupational Safety and Health Regu-
lations-A Comparison of Swedish and American Practices, in ENFORCING REGULA-
TION 98, 104-15 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1984); see also KEITH
HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION AND THE SOCIAL DEFINITION
OF POLLUTION 110-54 (1984) (describing a less adversarial enforcement approach by
water pollution inspectors in Great Britain).
30. Demmke, supra note 4, at 143.
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appears to be ensuring that environmental policy directives are
carried out appropriately in the member states."31
II. SPOTLIGHTING IS AN EFFECTIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOL
The concept of using information disclosure, or spotlighting,
to achieve environmental objectives has become increasingly pop-
ular in the past two decades. This policy tool enjoys support
across the political spectrum-economists like it because it relies
on the efficiency of market forces, while environmental advocates
favor it because it can promote citizen empowerment and create
incentives for firms to reduce harmful activities. 32 Moreover, gov-
ernments like it because it does not require a lot of governmental
resources, infrastructure, or personnel.
Spotlighting has also proven to be quite effective. 33 This is
because it takes advantage of the basic fact that all companies de-
sire to avoid negative publicity, including publicity regarding their
environmental record. As the architects of the popular "Score-
card" website explain, "[b]y spotlighting the companies with the
worst environmental records, we sought to create strong incen-
tives for pollution reduction - no one enjoys holding the rank of top
polluter in their community."34 Indeed, in one compliance study,
managers at a pulp and paper mill told researchers that the sanc-
tions the facility feared the most were the informal sanctions im-
posed by the public and the media and that "they were motivated
less by avoiding regulatory violations per se than by avoiding 'any-
thing that could give you a bad name."' 35
31. JANET R. HUNTER & ZACHARY A. SMITH, PROTECTING OUR ENVIRONMENT: LES-
SONS FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION 91 (2005).
32. See Michael Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regu-
lated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 530 (2004)
(noting that "information disclosure may be less expensive for regulators and regu-
lated entities than command and control requirements, may be more flexible and effi-
cient than command and control or market mechanisms, and may enhance
deliberative democracy").
33. David Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Information Regulation: A
Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 386 (2005) ("Empirical stud-
ies, though limited, demonstrate that information disclosure can be a powerful lever
in motivating improved environmental performance by regulated firms.").
34. About Scorecard: The History of Scorecard, http://www.scorecard.org/aboutl
txt/history.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
35. Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why
Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 307, 321 (2004). Another
study found some, albeit mixed, evidence that past noncompliance by a commercial
hazardous waste management facility led to a reduction in the quantity of waste sent
2007] 167
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There is substantial evidence that a spotlighting approach to
combating environmental problems achieves concrete results.
The most well developed spotlighting programs are pollutant re-
gistries, such as the United States' Toxics Release Inventory
("TRI") program, which require firms to publicly disclose their re-
leases and transfers of certain pollutants. 36 TRI covers 666 toxic
chemicals used by industrial facilities in the United States in
amounts above certain thresholds.37 From 1988 to 2004, releases
of chemicals subject to TRI reporting dropped by a remarkable
57%, or 1.71 billion pounds 38 (this figure covers those chemicals
that have been on the list for this entire period).39 EPA officials, as
well as environmentalists and regulated entities, regularly tout
TRI as one of the United States' most effective environmental
laws. 40 Professor Bradley Karkkainen describes TRI as a "water-
shed" and argues that this program works because it establishes
an objective, comparable, and broadly accessible performance met-
ric.4 1 He notes that TRI compels firms to self-monitor and "con-
front disagreeable realities" concerning their performance, and
that it subjects them to the scrutiny of a variety of external par-
ties-including investors, community residents, and regulators-
each of whom can exert powerful pressures to improve the firm's
performance. 42 A related state program, the Massachusetts Toxics
Use Reduction Act ("TURA"), passed in 1989, requires industrial
facilities to publicly report the quantities of toxic chemicals they
use and generate as waste (as well as to prepare a toxics use re-
duction plan).43 From 1990 to 2004, facilities subject to TURA
to that facility by generators of hazardous waste. Sarah Stafford, Can Consumers
Enforce Environmental Regulations? The Role of the Market in Hazardous Waste
Compliance, 10-11 (Coll. of William & Mary, Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 19,
2005).
36. Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program, http://www.epa.gov/tri/ (last visited
Feb. 11, 2007).
37. EPA TRI: TRI Chemicals, http://www.epa.gov/tri/chemical/index.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 11, 2007).
38. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2004 TRI PUBLIC DATA RELEASE E-REPORT 16 (2006),
available at http://www.epa.gov/tri/tridata/tri04/ereport/2004eReport.pdf.
39. Id.
40. See Addition of Reporting Elements; Toxic Chemical Release Reporting; Com-
munity Right-to-Know, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,322, 51,322 (Oct. 1, 1996) ("EPA considers
Right-to-Know to be among its most effective strategies for improving environmental
performance.").
41. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 260,
295 (2001).
42. Id. at 295.
43. Id. at 354.
[Vol. 24168
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since the law's inception have decreased their toxic chemical use
by 41%, reduced their generation of waste by 65% per unit of prod-
uct, and slashed their releases of toxic chemicals by 91%.4 4
Some observers, though, offer more mixed appraisals of the
TRI program. Mary Graham and Catherine Miller, for example,
find a core of positive trends but note that the rate of decline of
toxic releases slowed markedly after the first five years of report-
ing, that the amount of toxic waste generated (as opposed to re-
leased) has continued to increase, and that few facilities have
employed source reduction to cut releases. 45 Other critics argue
that TRI data is inaccurate and unreliable and that it is mislead-
ing because it fails to convey information to the public about the
risk of toxic releases. 46
Similar to the U.S. TRI program, Canada's pollutant registry,
the National Pollutant Release Inventory ("NPRI"), established in
1992, requires companies to report environmental releases and
transfers of approximately 270 chemicals. 47 The NPRI has
sparked emission reductions in Canada, although not as dramatic
as those reported in the United States under TRI. From 1995 to
2003, NPRI facilities reduced their releases and transfers by
10%.48 (During this period, the number of facilities reporting in-
creased by 67%. For firms that reported both in 1995 and 2003,
the decrease in total releases and transfers was 20%. 49 ) One re-
cent study found that Canadian firms with consumer market ex-
44. Massachusetts Toxic Use Reduction Institute, Results to Date, http:/l
www.turadata.turi.org/Success/ResultsToDate.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
45. Mary Graham & Catherine Miller, Disclosure of Toxic Releases in the United
States, 43 ENV'T 8, 11-12 (Oct. 2001).
46. Kathryn E. Durham-Hammer, Left to Wonder: Reevaluating, Reforming, and
Implementing the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act of 1986, 29
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 323, 336-41 (2004); Alexander Volokh, The Pitfalls of the Envi-
ronmental Right-to Know, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 805, 814-24 (2002); Susan E. Dudley, It
is Time to Reevaluate the Toxic Release Inventory, 12 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1,
11-15 (2004). For an overview of the TRI program's impact, see JAMES T. HAMILTON,
REGULATION THROUGH REVELATION: THE ORIGIN, POLITICS, AND IMPACTS OF THE Tox-
iCs RELEASE INVENTORY PROGRAM 208-51 (2005).
47. About the NPRI, http://www.ec.gc.ca/pdb/nprinpri-aboute.cfm (last visited
Jan. 12, 2007); CEPA Environmental Registry: General Information, http:l!
www.ec.gc.ca/CEPARegistry/geneinfo/fsl.cfm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
48. COMM'N FOR ENVTL. COOPERATION, TAKING STOCK: 2003 NORTH AMERICAN POL-
LUTANT RELEASES AND TRANSFERS 160 (2006).
49. Id. at 140. In the first seven years of the program (1993 to 1999), covered
firms reduced their on-site releases by 27%. Two researchers have concluded that
most of these reductions resulted from traditional command-and-control regulation,
rather than voluntary reductions undertaken by firms in response to public pressure
stemming from disclosure of their releases. Kathryn Harrison & Werner Antweiler,
2007] 169
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posure reduced their emissions more than other firms subject to
NPRI, although the effect was relatively small.50 Other countries
with similar versions of pollutant registries include Australia, Ja-
pan, Mexico, and Norway, 51 and as discussed in more detail below,
members states of the EU.
Environmental groups have used pollutant registries like the
TRI and NPRI as a springboard to develop more detailed and per-
sonalized spotlighting tools. For example, the "Scorecard" website
mentioned above, created by the environmental organization En-
vironmental Defense, allows the public in the United States to an-
alyze and compare TRI data and other environmental information
by zip code or facility, and also provides estimates of the health
risks posed by certain releases. 52 Environmental groups in
Canada have developed a similar website entitled "Pollution
Watch."53
Beyond pollutant registries like TRI and NPRI, other infor-
mation disclosure programs have produced significant environ-
mental benefits. For example, California's Proposition 65, which
requires businesses to warn the public prior to exposing them to
listed carcinogens or reproductive toxins, has generated substan-
tial reductions in industrial air emissions and significant reformu-
lations of consumer products containing toxic chemicals (including
brass faucets, ceramic ware, calcium supplements, water meters,
water filters, rain coats and other plastic clothing, wooden play-
ground structures, and portable classrooms). 54 More generally, in
the consumer products market, there is some evidence that
awarding a positive environmental label to a product leads to a
substantial increase in the market share of the product (and, con-
versely, some evidence of companies whose sales dropped sharply
as a result of being labeled environmentally unfriendly). 55
Incentives for Pollution Abatement: Regulation, Regulatory Threats, and Non-Govern-
mental Pressures, 33 J. POL'Y ANAL. & MAN. 361, 368-69 (2003).
50. Werner Antweiler & Kathryn Harrison, Toxic Release Inventories and Green
Consumerism: Empirical Evidence From Canada, 36 CAN. J. ECON. 495, 517-18
(2003).
51. HAMILTON, supra note 46, at 239.
52. See Scorecard: The Pollution Information Site, http://www.scorecard.org/ (last
visited Dec. 1, 2006).
53. See PollutionWatch, http://www.pollutionwatch.org (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
54. Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Continued Success of Proposition 65 in Reducing
Toxic Exposures, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,850 (2005).
55. Clifford S. Russell et al., Environment, Information and Consumer Behavior:
An Introduction, in ENVIRONMENT, INFORMATION AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 1, 8-9
(Signe Krarup & Clifford S. Russell eds., 2005); cf. Christopher D. Clark & Clifford S.
[Vol. 24170
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To date, there have been few formal programs that mandate
disclosure of a firm's compliance or environmental performance
records. In a number of instances where such information has
been mandated, however, disclosure has stimulated improved en-
vironmental performance. For example, in Indonesia, the envi-
ronmental agency developed a color-coded grading system to
evaluate the environmental performance of industrial facilities. 56
Using this system, facility grades were then publicly disclosed, al-
though there was a six-month delay in disclosing firms in the
worst two categories to allow them an opportunity to improve
their performance. 57 Rates of compliance among participating fac-
tories increased from 35% to 51%, and discharges on average de-
clined by 43%.58
In a very similar program, China's Environmental Protection
Agency established "Greenwatch," a public disclosure program
that rates industrial environmental performance from best to
worst in five colors based on a firm's emissions, environmental
management practices, public complaints, regulatory actions and
penalties, and firm characteristics.5 9 In a pilot project conducted
in one Chinese city, the number of "superior" performing firms
doubled (from 31% to 62%) in the first year after the firm rankings
were publicly released; in a second city, the percentage of firms
rated good or better increased from 24% to 62% of total firms, and
Russell, Public Information Provision as a Tool of Environmental Policy, in ENVIRON-
MENT, INFORMATION AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR, supra, at 111, 112 (reporting some evi-
dence that environmental labels have prompted consumers to change their behavior
and chose eco-labeled products).
56. Shakeb Afsah & Jeffrey R. Vincent, Putting Pressure on Polluters: Indonesia's
PROPER Program (1999) (on file with author). The colors were chosen because they
had cultural connotations in Indonesia analogous to the environmental performance
levels they signified.
57. Shakeb Afsah et al., Regulation in the Information Age: Indonesian Public In-
formation Program for Environmental Management 7 (1997), available at http://siter-
esources.worldbank.org/NIPRINT/Resources/RegulationInThelnformationAge.pdf.
58. See id. at 9; Shakeb Afsah, Proper Program for Pollution Control Environmen-
tal Evaluation and Rating: A Model for Promoting Environmental Compliance and
Strengthening Transparency and Community Participation in Developing Countries
18 (on file with author).
59. Hua Wang et al., Public Ratings of Industry's Environmental Performance:
China's Greenwatch Program, Address at Seventh International Conference on Envi-
ronmental Enforcement (April 15-19, 2002), in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 2, 7 (In-
spectorate of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, The Netherlands, et
al., San Jose, Costa Rica) (2002), available at http://www.inece.org/conf/proceedings2/
52-Public%2ORatingsChina.pdf.
2007]
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the percentage of firms rated in the worst category decreased from
11% to 5%.60
Likewise, in 1990 the regional environmental agency in Brit-
ish Columbia, Canada began publishing a list of firms that were
significantly out of compliance with environmental requirements.
Over the subsequent six-year period, publication of the list had
positive impacts; firms that were included on the list significantly
reduced their emissions, even more so than firms out of compli-
ance that were subject to enforcement orders and penalties. 61 In
another (non-environmental disclosure) program, Los Angeles
County in 1997 required restaurants to post in their windows gov-
ernment-determined letter grades, reflecting the results of county
hygiene inspections. This local program resulted in revenue in-
creases for restaurants with higher grades and revenue decreases
for those with lower grades, as well as measurable increases in
hygiene quality and a consequent significant drop in hospitaliza-
tions due to food-related illnesses. 62
Notably, moreover, negative publicity about a firm's poor en-
vironmental record-even though not necessarily as part of a gov-
ernment mandated program-also can translate into adverse
economic impacts for the firm. Thus, public announcements about
the initiation of enforcement actions against a firm, environmen-
tal spills, or high levels of emissions have been shown to result in
significant reductions in the market value of the affected firm.63
For example, a study of stock market reactions to 730 EPA judi-
cial actions against publicly-traded firms from 1972-1991 found
60. Id. at 9-10.
61. J~r6me Foulon et al., Incentives for Pollution Control: Regulation or Informa-
tion?, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 169, 170-71 (2002).
62. Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of Transparency: What Makes Dis-
closure Policies Effective? 21 (Ash Inst. for Democratic Governance & Innovation,
John F. Kennedy School of Gov't, Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. OP-03-04, 2004),
available at http://www.archonfung.net/papers/FGWEffectiveness.pdf. Fung and his
colleagues argue, however, that transparency programs have a mixed record of suc-
cess. See id. at 22.
63. Paul Lanoie et al., Can Capital Markets Create Incentives for Pollution Con-
trol?, 26 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1, 35-36 (1998) (discussing various studies that reach this
conclusion). For example, Professor James Hamilton found that firms suffered statis-
tically significant negative stock returns of between 0.2% and 0.3%, an average loss
per firm of $4.1 million in stock value, when TRI data was first disclosed in 1989.
James T. Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to the Tox-
ics Release Data, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 98, 109 (1995). A later study looking at
chemical firms reported similar results following disclosure of TRI data in the years
1990-1994. Madhu Khanna et al., Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for Envi-
ronmental Protection, 36 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 243, 245 (1998).
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that the market value of "the average affected firm drop[ped]
0.43% during the week of settlement" of the enforcement action. 64
Likewise, another study found that public announcement of U.S.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") penal-
ties led to a significant drop in stock prices of the companies sub-
ject to those penalties.65 Another investigation looked at the
impact on stock prices of firms in three industrial sectors in India
after a leading environmental group published ratings about their
environmental performance, which generally showed poor per-
formance. 66 It found that in two of the three sectors examined,
stock prices declined significantly after the ratings were pub-
lished.67 The losses were more significant for firms with lower
rankings. 68 Similar results were reported in an analysis of the
reaction of capital markets to environmental performance disclo-
sure in the Republic of Korea, where, since the mid 1980s, the
Ministry of Environment has published a monthly list of facilities
in violation of Korean environmental laws and enforcement ac-
tions undertaken by the Ministry. 69 During the period from 1993
to 2002, publication of this information, in a majority of instances,
led to significant market reductions on the Korean Stock Ex-
change for the firms affected. The average percentage reduction
in market value was 9.7%.70
In sum, considerable experience to date shows that spotlight-
ing a firm's emissions, environmental performance, or record of
violations can be a very effective means of motivating better firm
performance and compliance.
64. S.G. Bandrinath & Paul J. Bolster, The Role of Market Forces in EPA Enforce-
ment Activity, 10 J. REG. ECON. 165, 167 (1996).
65. Wallace N. Davidson, III et al., The Effectiveness of OSHA Penalties: A Stock-
Market-Based Test, 33 INDUST. REL. 283 (1994).
66. Shreekant Gupta & Bishwanath Goldar, Do Stock Markets Penalise Environ-
ment-Unfriendly Behaviour? Evidence from India 12 (Ctr. for Dev. Econ., Working
Paper No. 116, 2003), available at http://www.cdedse.org/pdf/work116.pdf.
67. Id. at 12-15.
68. Id. at 16-17. The declines were as high as 43% for those identified as the worst
performers. Id. In a study of developing countries, other researchers found that stock
values fell in response to citizen complaints about firms and rose when positive envi-
ronmental performance was publicized by the government. See generally Susmita
Dasgupta et al., Pollution and Capital Markets in Developing Countries, 42 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MANAG. 310 (2001).
69. Susmita Dasgupta et al., Disclosure of Environmental Violations and Stock
Market in the Republic of Korea, 58 ECOL. ECON. 759 (2006).
70. Id.
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III. THE EU HAS EMBRACED THE CONCEPT OF
SPOTLIGHTING
The EU already has embraced the concept of spotlighting in a
number of areas of environmental policy. Most directly, since
2001 the EU has required member states to publish an inventory
of pollutant releases and transfers modeled after the TRI pro-
gram-first as part of the European Pollution Emission Register
("EPER") and then, beginning in 2007, under the European Pollu-
tant Release and Transfer Register ("E-PRTR") (established to im-
plement a protocol on pollution registries signed by the EU).71
The original EPER program covers fifty pollutants and approxi-
mately 9,200 facilities; it requires member states to file reports on
emissions of these pollutants within their jurisdiction every three
years.72 The register is available on a website hosted by the Euro-
pean Environment Agency, thus allowing the public to see de-
tailed data on individual facilities and rank them by the size of
their emissions.73 The first fully complete reporting year for
EPER was 2004, 74 during which its website received over 240,000
visitors.7 5 The new E-PRTR expands the number of pollutants
covered (to over 90), as well as the type of releases, and sources
covered by member state reports. 76 It also requires member
states to report annually on releases and transfers. 77 Like the
71. See Commission Decision of 17 July 2000 on the Implementation of a Euro-
pean Pollutant Emission Register According to Article 15 of Council Directive 96/61/
EC Concerning Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control, 2000 O.J. (L 192) 36,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2000/l_192/1 19220000728
en00360043.pdf, see generally Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No. 166/2006
of 18 January 2006 Concerning the Establishment of a European Pollutant Release
and Transfer Register and Amending Council Directives 91/689/EEC and 96/61/EC,
2006 O.J. (L 33) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/1l
033/1 03320060204en00010017.pdf [hereinafter Parliament and Council Regulation
No. 166/2006].
72. Welcome to EPER, http://www.eper.cec.eu.intleper/ (last visited Jan. 11,
2007); What is EPER, http://www.eper.cec.eu.int/eper/introduction.asp?i= (last visited
Jan. 11, 2007).
73. See Questions to EPER, http://www.eper.cec.eu.int/eper/faq.asp?i= (last vis-
ited Jan. 11, 2007).
74. Roel Brand et al., EPER Review Report 8 (June 2004), available at http:l
eper.ec.europa.eu/eper/documents/EPER%20Review%20report,%20final.pdf.
75. Press Release, European Environmental Agency, Updated Industrial Emis-
sions Register Reveals Mixed Results, (Nov. 23, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/
1618&format=HTML&aged=O&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
76. See Parliament and Council Regulation No. 166/2006, supra note 71, Annex I
(increasing the number of pollutants covered to over ninety); see also id. Annex II.
77. Id. art. 5(1)(a)-(c).
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EPER, the E-PRTR must be publicly accessible, user friendly, and
provide information to the public free of charge.78
In addition, to requiring publication of pollution registries by
member states, the EU is a party to the Arhus Convention, which
provides a broad right of public access to environmental informa-
tion (as well as participation in environmental decision-making,
and access to justice to redress environmental violations).79 Mem-
ber states are required to make all environmental information
that they possess accessible to the public and to prepare and pub-
lish a report on the state of the environment at least every four
years, including information "on the quality of, and pressures on,
the environment."80
The EU also has utilized spotlighting with success in its Bath-
ing Waters Directive.8 ' This directive, originally adopted in 1975
and strengthened in 2006, establishes water quality standards for
beaches used by swimmers.8 2 Although plagued by considerable
noncompliance, this directive also resulted in significant improve-
ments in water quality, in considerable part because of public dis-
closure about water quality at EU beaches.8 3 Since 1991 the
European Commission has published an annual report on beach
water quality in member states (the only directive for which the
European Commission has published such a report).8 4 Probably
even more significantly, since 1987 environmental groups have
78. Id. arts. 8(2), 10(1).
79. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making
and Access to Justice regarding Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38. I.L.M.
517, available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf [hereinafter
Arhus Convention].
80. See generally Parliament and Council Directive 2003/4/EC, art. 7(3), 2003 O.J.
(L 41/26) (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu[LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2003/l041/
l_04120030214en00260032.pdf; see also John M. Ackerman & Irma E. Sandoval-Bal-
lesteros, The Global Explosion of Freedom of Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 85,
86 (2006) (noting that as of 2005, sixty-six countries had passed laws guaranteeing
citizens access to information).
81. See Council Directive 76/160/EEC, 1976 O.J. (L 31) 1 (EC), available at http:
//eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31976LO160:EN:HTML
[hereinafter Bathing Waters Directive].
82. See Parliament and Council Directive 2006/7/EC, art. 5, 2006 O.J. (L 64) 37
(EU), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/L_064/
1_06420060304en00370051.pdf [hereinafter Parliament and Council Directive 2006/7/
EC]; see also id. Annex II; Sixth Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 12.
83. See Sixth Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 12 ("The Bathing Water Report
2003 shows that bathing water quality in fifteen 'old' [miember [sitates (EU15) con-
tinues to improve.").
84. Accurate Testing of Bathing Water, http://ec.europa.eu/research/success/en/
med/0012e.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
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developed a complementary spotlighting campaign, known as the
"Blue Flag Campaign." 5 This Campaign awards "Blue Flags" to
beaches and marinas that meet water quality criteria set forth in
the Bathing Waters Directive (or other national requirements for
non-EU countries), as well as other detailed requirements relating
to environmental management, safety and services on the beach
and the provision of environmental education and information. 6
Beaches and marinas can display their Blue Flag designations,
and information about participating areas is widely publicized.
The Blue Flag is now a well-known and widely recognized eco-la-
bel for tourists, and localities vie to obtain certification under the
program.8 7 It operates in 36 countries, and in 2006, 2,599 beaches
and 644 marinas were awarded the Blue Flag.88 There are related
award schemes in individual European countries including the
Strandtafel Award in Germany (administered by the state of
Schleswig-Holstein)8 9 and the "Seaside Awards, "9° "Good Beach
Guide,"91 and "Green Coast" Awards 92 in Great Britain adminis-
tered by environmental groups. (The United States employs an
approach similar to the EU's Bathing Water Directive. The
"Beaches Bill," enacted by Congress in 2000, requires states to
monitor the water quality of beaches and report this data to the
EPA and the public. 93 The environmental group Natural Re-
sources Defense Council publicizes local beach quality and clo-
85. KRAMER, supra note 1, § 7-15; Blue Flag History, http://www.blueflag.org/
BlueFlagHistory (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
86. See Blue Flag Programme, http://www.blueflag.org/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
87. RODIGER K. W. WURZEL, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY-MAKING IN BRITAIN, GER-
MANY, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE EUROPEANISATION OF AIR AND WATER POLLU-
TION CONTROL 225 (2002) (noting that Blue Flag has become one of best known eco-
labels in Europe).
88. Blue Flag Beaches/Marinas, http://www.blueflag.org/blueflag (last visited
Jan. 10, 2007).
89. WURZEL, supra note 87, at 226-28.
90. See Seaside Awards, http://www.seasideawards.org.uk/sea2.asp (last visited
Jan. 8, 2007) (criteria also focused on rural beaches and more emphasis on litter
management).
91. See The Good Beach Guide, httpJ/www.goodbeachguide.co.uk/ (last visited
Jan. 10, 2007).
92. See Green Coast Awards, http://www.keepwalestidy.org/englishldefault.asp?
Category=Tourism&NewsID =17&Menu=0.26.12.61 (last visited Jan. 10, 2007) (crite-
ria also include unspoiled, natural character of beaches).
93. See Beaches Environmental Assessment and Coastal Health Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-284, § 4, 114 Stat. 872 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
33 U.S.C.).
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sures through its own annual reports. 94 According to the EPA,
from 2002 to 2004 the percentage of days on which beaches were
closed and had health advisories declined, despite an increase in
the number of beaches monitored.95)
Amendments to the EU Bathing Waters Directive, adopted in
2006, build on the spotlighting approach to environmental regula-
tion.96 These amendments divide beaches into four classifications
based on beach water quality: excellent, good, sufficient, and
poor.97 They require that information about a beach's quality
classification, the results of water quality monitoring, the beach's
management plan, and other relevant information, be made read-
ily available to the public both through displays at the beach and
through the media and the Internet.98 The amendments also re-
quire the Commission to publish an annual report on bathing
water quality, including classifications, within the EU.99
The EU's voluntary Eco-Management and Auditing Scheme
("EMAS") also relies on information disclosure to prompt better
environmental performance.' 00 To achieve EMAS registration, a
firm must follow certain requirements for adopting an environ-
mental management system and prepare a public environmental
report. 101 The report must include a description of all firm activi-
ties resulting in significant environmental impacts, a statement of
94. See MARK DORFMAN, MSPH, TESTING THE WATERS 2006: A GUIDE TO WATER
QUALITY AT VACATION BEACHES, POLLUTION-RELATED BEACH CLOSINGS AND ADVISO-
RIES CLIMB IN 2005 (2006), available at http://www.nrdc.org/water/oceans/nttw.asp.
95. William Yardley, Beach Closings and Advisories Rose in 2005, Council Re-
ports, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2006, at A12 (the EPA reported that the percentage of
beaches with advisories declined from six percent to four percent from 2002 to 2004;
the Natural Resources Defense Council, however, contends that the number of clos-
ings and advisories actually increased five percent from 2004 to 2005).
96. See Parliament and Council Directive 2006/7/EC, supra note 82.
97. Id. art. 5(1)(a)-(d).
98. Id. arts. 7, 13(4).
99. Id. art. 13.
100. Dialogue and Reporting, http://www.emas.org.uk/aboutemas/mainframe.htm
(last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
101. Parliament and Council Regulation 761/2001, Allowing Voluntary Participa-
tion by Organisations in a Community Eco-Management and Audit Scheme, 2001
O.J. (L 114) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu /LexUriServ/site/enroj/2001/_114/
1_11420010424en00010029.pdf [hereinafter Parliament and Council Regulation 761/
2001]. Specifically, firms must (1) conduct a review of all environmental aspects of
the firm's activities; (2) establish an effective management system that, among other
things, commits the firm to continuous improvement of its performance (since 2001,
this system can be the International Organization for Standardization ("ISO") 14001
EMS, although EMAS also goes beyond ISO 14001 in several respects); (3) carry out
an audit assessing the effectiveness of the firm's management system and compliance
with regulatory requirements; and (4) prepare a public statement of environmental
17
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the organization's performance as compared to its goals and im-
provement targets, and information on the organization's compli-
ance with legal requirements.10 2 As Professor David Case argues,
"public environmental information disclosure is the "prime objec-
tive" of the EMAS regulation."1 0 3
The only tangible reward (other than the internal improve-
ments that may result from adopting a management system) for
entities that participate in EMAS is enhanced public reputation-
facilities that are registered are entitled to display an "attractive"
("visible and recognizable") EMAS logo on their letterheads, envi-
ronmental statements, and product advertisements. EMAS has
engendered some, albeit limited, participation; at the start of
2005, more than 4,000 facilities representing more than 3,000
firms had obtained registration under EMAS. (The relatively lim-
ited participation in EMAS is likely due in part to it being over-
shadowed by International Organization for Standardization
("ISO") 14001, a competing environmental management standard.
As of the end of 2005, over 111,000 firms worldwide had achieved
certification under ISO 14001.104)
The EU also has been moving toward requiring greater envi-
ronmental information disclosure in annual corporate reports.
Under its 2003 "Modernization Directive" (dealing with EU com-
panies' financial reporting), for example, the EU requires large
public corporations to include an analysis of their environmental
performance necessary to understand the "company's develop-
ment, performance or position" in their annual reports. 10 5 Profes-
sors Cynthia Williams and John Conley term this requirement an
example of general "sustainability reporting."os An earlier set of
recommendations adopted by the European Commission goes fur-
ther, calling on EU companies to disclose specific environmental
information such as the company's policy and programs; environ-
mental improvements in key areas; resource, water, and energy
performance. In addition, an independent, accredited third party must verify that the
firm has met all the requirements of the EMAS regulation. Id. art. 3(2)(a)-(d).
102. Id .at Annex 111(3.2).
103. Case, supra note 33, at 404.
104. See Int'l Org. on Standardization, The ISO Survey of Certifications 2005, at 9,
available at http://www.iso.org/iso/en/iso9000-14000/pdf/survey2005.pdf.
105. Parliament and Council Directive 2003/51, 2003 O.J. (L 178) 16, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.euLexUriServ/site/en/oj/2003/l_178/1-17820030717en00160022.
pdf.
106. Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion
of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 493, 530
(2005).
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use; emissions and waste disposal; material environmental liabili-
ties; significant fines and payments resulting from noncompliance
with environmental regulations or tort liability; and government
environmental incentives received by the firm in their annual
reports*107
A number of EU countries, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Swe-
den, and Spain also require companies to provide expanded envi-
ronmental information in their annual reports.108  Most
expansively, France requires each company that trades on the
French stock exchange to provide extremely detailed environmen-
tal and other social information in its annual report to sharehold-
ers, including resource use, emissions, environmental
management systems, and sanctions paid because of environmen-
tal damage.10 9 Similarly, in 2005 the British government promul-
gated regulations that would have required 1,300 British-based
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange and the two ma-
jor U.S. exchanges to publish an annual report identifying mate-
rial social and environmental risk and disclose information about
those risks.11° These regulations were unexpectedly withdrawn in
late 2005, but some observers expect them to be reinstated. 1'
Large corporations also have begun to voluntarily prepare for-
mal corporate environmental reports in response to the growing
socially responsible investment movement in Europe (and the
United States). This movement evaluates the social records of
companies, including their record of environmental compliance
and performance, when making investment decisions in the stock
market. 1 2 In Europe, the socially responsible investment market
in 2003 was estimated at approximately C 12.2 billion for individ-
107. Commission Recommendation of 30 May 2001 on the Recognition, Measure-
ment and Disclosure of Environmental Issues in the Annual Accounts and Annual
Reports of Companies, 2001 O.J. (L 156) 33, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex-
UriServ/site/en/oj/2001/I_156/1_15620010613en00330042.pdf.
108. Williams & Conley, supra note 106, at 504.
109. Id. at 504-05.
110. John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, EMBED, and Embellish:
Theory vs. Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CoRP. L. 1,
3 (2005).
111. Id. at 3-4.
112. See generally CSR Europe et al., Investing in Responsible Business: The 2003
Survey of European Fund Managers, Financial Analysts and Investor Relations
Officers, available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/dtt-gfsiCSRweb2_
110603.pdf [hereinafter Investing in Responsible Business]; Soc. Inv. Forum, 2005 Re-
port on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United States: 10 Year Review
(2006), available at http://www.socialinvest.org/areas/research/trends/sri-trends_
report_2005.pdf [hereinafter 2005 Report].
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ual investors and C336 billion for institutional investors. 113 To-
day, 68% of large companies in Western Europe report on their
economic, social and environmental performance. 11 4
Lastly, the EU has adopted a voluntary "eco-labeling" pro-
gram to promote a reliable market for environmentally friendly
products and services. 115 Firms that wish to display the EU's
"eco-label" must demonstrate to government agencies that they
meet detailed environmental criteria, which focus on reductions in
the environmental impacts of a product or service throughout its
life-cycle (from raw material through extraction, production, dis-
tribution and disposal)." 6 As of August 2006, 339 eco-label li-
censes had been granted, covering several hundred products. 17
The EU also has directives that set requirements for labels on or-
ganic foods, genetically modified organisms, and household appli-
ances (requiring information about energy consumption, noise,
water use, and power)."" Moreover, there are other non-govern-
mental voluntary labeling schemes in the EU, such as the marine
stewardship scheme for fisheries. 119
Thus, in a variety of contexts, EU policymakers and others
recognize the value of spotlighting to motivate better environmen-
tal performance. It's time to expand the spotlighting concept to
the enforcement context to promote more widespread compliance
with EU environmental law.
113. Investing in Responsible Business, supra note 112, at 9. In the United States,
approximately $2.29 trillion of professionally managed assets are invested according
to social criteria-approximately 9.4% of such assets. 2005 Report, supra note 121, at
iv.
114. Investing in Responsible Business, supra note 112, at 20.
115. See Welcome to the European Union Eco-label Homepage, http://ec.europa.eu/
environmentjecolabel/index en.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
116. Parliament and Council Regulation 1980/2000, On a Revised Community Eco-
label Award Scheme, 2000 O.J. (L 237) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri
Serv/site/en/oj/2000/1l237/l_23720000921en00010012.pdf.
117. The Use of the European Eco-Label Criteria in Green Public Procurement Ap-
proaches, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabelpdf/marketing/management_
group/eu..ecolabel-criteria-ingpphelpdesk.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
118. The sale of organic foods has been increasing throughout Europe. Mette Wier
et al., Information Provision, Consumer Perceptions and Values-The Case of Organic
Foods, in ENVIRONMENT, INFORMATION AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR, supra note 55, at
161, 161.
119. See Welcome to MSC Online, http://eng.msc.org/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
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IV. THE NEXT STEP FOR THE EU: SPOTLIGHTING
ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
INFORMATION
Despite its potential, so far spotlighting has only been em-
ployed as an enforcement strategy in a very limited way. Yet as
discussed above, spotlighting is a valuable and cost-effective tool
that should be better exploited by EU regulators. 120 While the EU
has embraced spotlighting in some contexts, such as the E-PRTR
and with respect to beaches, it has not publicized the extent to
which individual companies are meeting the requirements of EU
law (with the notable exception of Great Britain, discussed below).
This article proposes that EU regulators take the next step and
publicly profile and disclose the compliance records of individual
firms in all member states.
The U.S. EPA has taken a major step in this direction with its
Enforcement and Compliance History Online ("ECHO") web-
site. 121 Started in 2002, ECHO provides enforcement and compli-
ance information about three major statutes-the Clean Water
Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act-for approximately 800,000 regulated facilities.122 This
includes information from the previous two years regarding: facil-
ity inspections and evaluations, compliance status, violations de-
tected, pollutants associated with the violations and whether they
are significant, formal enforcement actions, and penalties imposed
as a result of enforcement actions. 123 In little more than its first
three years of operation, the website received approximately 2.5
million visits. 124
Great Britain's Environmental Agency has gone further than
ECHO and has presented a template for the rest of the EU to fol-
120. See Robert H. Cutting et al., Enforcement Data: A Tool for Environmental
Management, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,060-61 (2006) ("an assemblage
of existing enforcement and compliance data from all environmental regulatory agen-
cies in a publicly accessible format would be a valuable tool that is either overlooked
by policymakers or is intentionally ignored").
121. See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Enforcement and Compliance History Online, http:l!
www.epa.gov/echo/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
122. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Enforcement and Compliance History Online: About the
Site, http://www.epa.gov/echo /aboutsite.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
123. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Enforcement and Compliance History Online: About the
Data, http://www.epa.gov /echo/aboutdata.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
124. Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Three EPA Programs Nominated for Gov-
ernment 'Oscars,' (March 30, 2006), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/adm-
press.nsf/198a007cc57e64d3852570210055f3f6/ 09d2dfd224b8298f85257141005987 ia
!OpenDocument&Highlight=0,ECHO.
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low. For the past decade, the Agency has published a "Spotlight
on Business Environmental Performance," which details the envi-
ronmental performance and compliance record of individual firms
in various business sectors. 125 Within each sector, the report
highlights good and bad performers (including some case studies),
pollution incidents, and fines assessed over a given threshold. 126
In its 2005 report, for example, the Agency listed the ten firms
with the highest cumulative fines, events leading to prosecution,
and repeat offenses. 127 The Agency also grades operator perform-
ance from "A" to "E" based on the firm's ability to comply with
permit conditions and its actual compliance history, including vio-
lations, pollution incidents, and prosecutions. 128 Within its grad-
ing scheme, the Agency divides operators into three categories of
regulated facilities: publicly-traded corporations (including the
stock market listed parent companies of the businesses high-
lighted) large private companies, and small and medium sized
companies. 129
In its 2002 annual report, the Environment Agency noted the
positive results achieved through its spotlighting reports program:
When the Environment Agency first turned the media spot-
light on poor environmental performance five years ago, a cho-
rus of disapproval rose through the ranks of regulated industry.
Five years on, Spotlight on business environmental per-
formance has developed and expanded into a rounded assess-
ment of performance, good and bad, and highlights positive
action as well as failings. In its short lifetime the report has
become a regular fixture in the environmental calendar, its find-
ings keenly anticipated by some, anxiously awaited by others.
The latest report shows the positive trends of previous
years continuing. [These trends include] reductions in many
pollutants and significant overall improvements in environmen-
tal management. 130
125. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY, THE ENVIRONMENT: WHAT'S IN IT FOR
YOU? SPOTLIGHT ON BUSINEss ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE IN 2005, 2006, available
at http://publications.environment-agency.gov.uk/pdf/GEHO0706BLBM-e-e.pdf [here-
inafter SPOTLIGHT ON BusINEss ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE IN 2005].
126. See generally id.
127. See generally id.
128. Id. at 42.
129. Id. at 5.
130. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, SPOTLIGHT ON BusINEss ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORM-
ANCE, 2002, at 1, available at http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/docu-
ments/2003/07/30/spL2002full_523404.pdf.
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A more recent observer describes the positive impact of the
spotlighting reports:
There has been an impact here, specifically on major utility cor-
porations and investors such as in the waste industry and the
water quality industry. The reality of convictions and the "nam-
ing and shaming" is that it is effective. It does modify company
behavior as it has caused problems in England and Wales and
overseas. Experience has been had, for example, of other com-
panies contacting the [Environment Agency] to seek advice of
how to best avoid doing something illegal that their competitors
have done. Public limited companies do not like badpublicity .... 131
The EU itself, however, has only taken small steps in the di-
rection of using spotlighting to showcase the compliance records of
regulated firms. In the Commission's last several reports on the
implementation of EU environmental law, it has published "score-
boards" documenting comparative implementation records, but
only on a member state basis. 132 These reports compare various
types of noncompliance by member states (such as missed dead-
lines for transposition measures, incorrect transposition of direc-
tives, and inadequate implementation of directives, in certain
regulatory areas). 133
In order to improve compliance with the large body of EU
laws, the EU should publicly evaluate and compare the compli-
ance records of the best and worst regulated facilities. It should
rank facilities based on factors such as the number and severity of
violations, the number of civil and criminal prosecutions, the size
of penalties assessed, the degree to which discharges or emissions
exceed permitted levels, and the number and severity of spills or
accidental releases. More ambitiously, and perhaps further down
the road, the EU also should require member states to evaluate
"operator performance" (as the British Environmental Agency
does) based on the firm's ability to comply with permit conditions,
including the quality of its environmental management systems
and internal mechanisms for monitoring compliance.
A reasonable starting point for this program would be to spot-
light the record of facilities governed by the EU's Integrated Pollu-
131. Martha Grekos, Environmental Fines - All Small Change, J. PLANNING &
ENVT'L L. 1330, 1336 (2004).
132. See, e.g., Sixth Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 5.
133. See id. at 53-58.
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tion Prevention and Control Directive, which applies to major
industrial facilities that are responsible for a large share of pollu-
tion in Europe, including the chemical, energy, mineral, paper,
and waste processing sectors.134 An estimated 50,000 facilities
are covered by this directive. 135
It is important that the reports about firm compliance within
EU states be comparative. Spotlighting is at its most powerful
and effective when it draws clear distinctions among firms. Pro-
fessor Shelley Metzenbaum explains that spotlight comparison
has great power to embarrass and motivate, just as comparison
shopping by consumers spurs firms to improve their products. 36
As one recent analysis argues, publicizing enforcement and com-
pliance data "provides both positive reinforcement for those in
compliance and negative reinforcement for those who are not....
The regulated community is wary about the release of [environ-
mental] performance and enforcement information, which is pre-
cisely why it can be so effective."1 37
It is also important that the task of publicizing data and
drawing comparisons be done by an EU governmental agency, as
opposed to having the government make raw data available and
letting environmental groups prepare evaluative reports. When
the government is actively involved in evaluating private firm per-
formance, the evaluations are likely to carry greater weight and
credibility with the public.' 38 In particular, the spotlighting
should be carried out by the European Environment Agency,
which already has responsibility for maintaining the E-PRTR.
Lastly, and most obviously, an effective spotlighting system
depends upon having underlying data to disclose. There are cur-
134. Council Directive 96/61, 1996 O.J. (L 257) 26, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996L0061:EN:HTML (con-
cerning integrated pollution prevention and control).
135. The IPPC Directive, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ippc/index.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 30, 2007).
136. SHELLEY METZENBAUM, BROOKINGS INST. CTR. FOR PUB. MGMT., MAKING MEA-
SUREMENT MATTER: THE CHALLENGE AND PROMISE OF BUILDING A PERFORMANCE-Fo-
CUSED ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SYSTEM 42 (1998), available at http://
www.brook.edu/gs/cpm/metzenbaum.pdf.
137. Cutting et al., supra note 120, at 10,061-62. A study by the Oregon Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality found that "65% of Oregonians would stop or reduce
buying from a company that was 'taking action that was bad for the environment.'"
Id. at 10,064.
138. C.f John Thogersen, Consumer Behavior and the Environment: Which Role
for Information, in ENVIRONMENT, INFORMATION AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR, supra note
55, at 51-53 (consumers trust information about energy-conserving improvements
more when provided by the government than private firms).
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rently considerable gaps in information concerning the extent to
which EU laws are actually complied with. If member states are
not monitoring compliance or collecting data about the perform-
ance of firms, it will be impossible for the EU to report this infor-
mation. Some member states, however, currently lack the
administrative capacity (or perhaps the political will) to effectively
monitor the behavior of regulated entities. Further, even where
they do collect this information, they may not turn it over to the
EU. One leading authority indicates that it has been "extremely
difficult" for the EU to gain access to data held by national, re-
gional, or local authorities.139 He further contends that "no ad-
ministration would be easily persuaded to release data showing
that a directive is not properly monitored or applied in prac-
tice."140 Thus, a basic prerequisite for a spotlighting program is
that the EU adopt a directive or regulation mandating that mem-
ber states systematically collect and maintain data about compli-
ance by regulated entities within their borders.
To be sure, there will be significant hurdles to the implemen-
tation of an EU spotlighting program. Countries that are resis-
tant to meaningful implementation of EU law will not want
attention drawn to their enforcement deficits. Likewise, compa-
nies that are violating the law will not welcome the harsh glare of
additional public attention and notoriety (though firms that are
leaders in environmental performance and compliance are keen to
publicize this fact). If these hurdles are overcome, however, a
spotlighting approach could work where other traditional methods
of environmental enforcement have failed. This approach is far
less intrusive and expensive than direct EU enforcement. It
should not be seen as compromising the sovereignty of individual
countries or interfering with their primary role in achieving en-
forcement within their boundaries. Spotlighting also does not re-
quire levying fines or other sanctions for noncompliance, which
countries may be reluctant to impose. Rather, it relies on the sim-
ple but potent power of public scrutiny to motivate better
performance.
139. KRAMER, supra note 1, § 12-16.
140. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
To date, efforts to ensure widespread compliance with EU en-
vironmental laws have been met with mixed success. The spot-
lighting approach offers a practical and effective alternative, and
should be implemented by the EU.
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss1/7
